EBE Chapter 738 The Reason for the Failure
Chapter 738 The Reason for the Failure
It can be seen that the Chinese government's army had been severely damaged after fighting the well-equipped Japanese army for more than seven years. The troops in the First War Zone of the Chinese government were in poor condition, with serious troop shortages, poor weapons and equipment, and insufficient numbers.
Moreover, most of the soldiers in the Chinese army were farmers, and many of them were forcibly conscripted men. This made the gap between the Chinese army and the Japanese soldiers in terms of knowledge level, military technology and fighting will be even greater.
As for strategic and tactical issues, the flat terrain in central Henan is conducive to the absolute advantage of the Japanese mechanized forces and cavalry. The Chinese army, which lacks heavy weapons, should play to its strengths and avoid its weaknesses, making full use of natural barriers such as the Yellow River defense line to delay the Japanese offensive, and at the same time deploy the main forces of the Chinese army in mountainous areas such as Songshan Mountain and Funiushan Mountain to fight a decisive battle with the Japanese offensive forces. In particular, cities such as Zhengzhou, Xuchang, and Xinzheng are basically indefensible places, which is not conducive to the Chinese army, which is already poorly equipped, fighting with the Japanese mechanized forces in these places.
In fact, the top leadership of the Chinese government ordered Commander Tang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the First War Zone of the Chinese government, to concentrate the main forces of the First War Zone to fight a decisive battle with the Japanese offensive forces in Songshan. This strategy was completely correct. Commander Tang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the First War Zone of the Chinese government, also deployed the troops accordingly in accordance with the instructions of the top leadership of the Chinese government.
However, not long after, the Military General Staff of the Chinese Government ordered Commander Tang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the First War Zone of the Chinese Government, to change the location of the decisive battle with the Japanese attacking forces to the plains areas such as Yu County, Mixian, Xuchang, and Luohe. Therefore, Commander Tang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the First War Zone of the Chinese Government, changed the deployment of the troops in accordance with the order of the Military General Staff of the Chinese Government.
As a result, the First War Zone of the Chinese Government was completely passive from the very beginning of the Battle of Central Henan. In the end, the First War Zone Command of the Chinese Government could only deploy entire regiments and divisions to defend the city with all their might, which not only dispersed the troops but also increased casualties.
Faced with the powerful firepower and mechanized impact of the Japanese offensive forces, the troops of the First War Zone of the Chinese government retreated to the mountains after suffering heavy losses. However, at this time, the troops of the First War Zone of the Chinese government had already been defeated and had no combat effectiveness at all.
Commander Jiang, the commander of the First War Zone of the Chinese Government, and Commander Tang, the deputy commander, had long lost interest in improving the training and combat effectiveness of their troops, and instead concentrated on running business. This resulted in the officers of all ranks in the First War Zone of the Chinese Government being basically focused on smuggling and business, and their fighting will was exhausted.
In addition, the Chinese military's command system is extremely chaotic, and the troops' combat sequence is changing at any time. Some army-level or division-level troops have already begun to act according to the orders they received, but the higher-level command is still unaware.
Coupled with the frequent transfer of troops, these troops have no fixed sense of responsibility at all. For example, the 85th Army of the First War Zone of the Chinese Government was originally an elite force of the Chinese Government. It was also the main force of the First War Zone of the Chinese Government and one of the main targets of annihilation of the offensive forces of the Japanese 12th Army.
However, before the Battle of Central Henan began, Commander Tang, deputy commander of the First War Zone of the Chinese government, made a stupid move. He disrupted the troop organization of the 85th Army of the Chinese government and ordered the 85th Army to send troops to replace the defense zone of the newly formed 42nd Division in Zhengzhou. He also ordered the 85th Army of the Chinese government to send another part of its troops to guard Mi County.
The 85th Army of the Chinese government was originally short of manpower, but now it was responsible for the defense of more than 40 kilometers on the front. This put the 85th Army of the Chinese government, like other troops of the Chinese government, in a passive position under the fierce firepower attack of the Japanese offensive forces that broke through the Yellow River defense line.
The mobile forces could not be used, and communication and transportation were difficult, so the commanders could not understand the entire battle situation. This caused even greater difficulties for the national army, which was already at a disadvantage.
During the Battle of Central Henan, the Japanese attacking forces still adopted the old tactics of flanking and cone-shaped attacks, while the First War Zone Command of the Chinese government still did not allocate troops to ensure the safety of the flanks and rear, and many places were not even defended at all.
If the First War Zone Command of the Chinese Government could have made the various parts of the Chinese Army cooperate in combat, they could at least have sent troops to cooperate with the Chinese Army on frontal defense to guard against the Japanese offensive forces' attacks on the flanks, and to attack the Japanese offensive forces from both sides at the same time. However, the command of the First War Zone Command of the Chinese Government was exactly the opposite, which resulted in the Chinese Army being completely defeated one by one by the Japanese offensive forces.
This is also the fundamental problem of the Chinese army, that is, the knowledge, ability and spirit of the generals in the Chinese army are inversely proportional to the level of the position they hold.
In the Chinese military, from the regimental level to the division and army levels, the combat command operations of the headquarters at all levels are extremely imperfect. Map exercises and sand tables are completely absent, and the exercises of command posts and staff operations are completely ignored.
Therefore, when the Chinese army started fighting the Japanese army, the officers and soldiers often did not understand what they should do. There was neither a specific combat plan nor a complete combat order.
Many of the personnel in the headquarters at the regimental level and above in the Chinese army are not formal officers. Most of them are privately appointed by the unit chief. This results in many important positions in the army being given to outdated officers or literati who have no understanding of military operations.
Although some of the staff officers in the Chinese army are graduates of academic schools, most of these staff officers lack practical combat experience and have not received any specialized business training in the army. Therefore, it is often the case that the staff officers in charge of personnel management do not know how to manage personnel issues, and the staff officers in charge of troop supplies do not know how to handle troop supply issues. As for the quartermaster and ordnance personnel in the army, they are mostly just filling in the numbers. These quartermasters do not even have the common sense of the need to conduct regular inspections of the items in their own troops.
There was also the serious failure of the Chinese government in political work and its military discipline was too poor. During the Battle of Central Henan, people from western Henan actually intercepted the Chinese army everywhere. Whether it was guns, ammunition, anti-aircraft guns, or radio stations, they were all intercepted by the people.
There were even cases of attacking the Chinese troops and shooting officers and soldiers. Moreover, wherever the Chinese army went, the local headmen, village heads and township heads all fled, and all the food stored in the local government warehouses was looted, resulting in an empty house and a clear field. As a result, the officers and soldiers of the Chinese army went without a meal for several days.